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The “Ethical” Surplus of the War on Illegal
Immigration
Francis J. Mootz III* & Leticia M. Saucedo**
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The Aristotelian philosopher, Gene Garver, argues that rhetorical claims
have an “ethical surplus.” 2 When a person argues for a policy position, she
commits herself to more than the specific claim for which she is arguing and
also for more than what that specific claim logically entails. Ethical surplus
exists as a result of the nature of practical reasoning, in which the character
of the person speaking necessarily plays a role. Garver explains this concept
in the context of legal argumentation by emphasizing that Brown v. Board of
Education 3 re-committed the nation to the equality principle, 4 even though
the decision regrettably failed to provide quality, integrated public schools to
all children. 5 In this Article, we adopt Garver’s thesis of “ethical surplus,”
but we elaborate his thesis in a negative context. The war on illegal
immigration generated a rhetorical commitment that extends beyond the
specific claim to secure the borders against unlawful entry. The rhetoric of
“war” in this setting generates an ethical surplus—ethical in the sense of an
ethos, rather than being morally correct. After providing a short context of
the rhetoric of “war” used in connection with Arizona’s adoption of recent
anti-immigrant legislation, we explore the implications of this rhetoric in the

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Faculty Development, William S. Boyd Professor of
Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
** Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Legal Education, University of California, Davis,
School of Law.
1. We write this Article in the first person, which deviates from the convention of law review
articles. As will become clear, this choice is not merely stylistic. We reject the pretense of neutral
objectivity suggested by the rhetorical practices of legal academics and fully embrace our ethical
responsibility for what we write in this Article. We appreciate the decision of the editors to permit us
to write in a manner appropriate to our thesis.
2. EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF
AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 73–76 (2004).

ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER

3.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

4.

GARVER, supra note 2, at 83–85.

5. See generally GREG J. DUNCAN & RICHARD J. MURNANE, WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?:
RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES (2011).

more recent effort to eliminate race-conscious educational programs focused
on Mexican Americans in the public schools of Arizona. We conclude that
the war on illegal immigration has generated its ethical surplus in a manner
that betrays the true character of this war. It is not a war against illegal
border crossing; rather, it is a war against the perceived threat posed by
Mexicans living in the United States. As the ethical surplus of the antiimmigrant hyperbole becomes manifest, it reveals clearly the immoral and
discriminatory character of the rhetoric at work.
II. ETHOS AND ARGUMENTATION: THE CONCEPT OF “ETHICAL SURPLUS”
Garver’s proposition that legal arguments have an ethical dimension
might seem strange, given the adversarial and representative nature of the
judicial system. Lawyers regularly make arguments in the course of
representing clients that are persuasive (in general) and effective (in the
particular case) without personally subscribing to the goal of the argument.
For example, good men and women regularly make legal arguments that
result in guilty individuals walking out of the courtroom as free persons, and
even most laypersons understand that good legal arguments can sometimes
lead to such results. But it is also clear that a lawyer cannot misrepresent the
state of the law in an effort to secure the acquittal of her client. Legal
arguments have integrity as arguments. The integrity of an argument is not
judged solely by the ability of the speaker to achieve the desired result (e.g.,
her client is acquitted); this would embrace sophism. 6 Nor is the integrity of
an argument judged solely by the desirability of that result in its own right
(e.g., the wetlands are protected from development); this would embrace
instrumentalism. 7 Therefore, a compelling and responsible legal argument
might fail to persuade a given judge, or it might result in a guilty person
avoiding criminal sanction, without ceasing to have integrity as an exercise
of practical reasoning.
If a lawyer cannot demonstrate a claim with logic, some conclude that
the resulting argumentation is nothing more than a sophistic effort to secure
the (illogical) adherence of the audience. Garver reveals that practical
reasoning is more than sophism, and he suggests that legal argumentation is
a paradigm of practical reasoning because it cannot claim the status of
logical deduction, and yet it is not defined simply by whether one
successfully motivates one’s audience. 8 Aristotle’s view of rhetoric explains

6.

See GARVER, supra note 2, at 44–69.

7. In other words, the means of argumentation would be judged solely by the end brought
about, and therefore practical reasoning would be reduced to an instrument that achieves a
predetermined goal.
8.

See GARVER, supra note 2, at 44–68.

how legal arguments have an integrity that cannot be equated with their
success in motivating the listener to act. 9 Lawyers argue about matters that
are indeterminate, utilizing practical judgment rather than drawing
deductions about necessary truths by using strict reason. Effective practical
reasoning cannot violate logical rules; however, logical consistency alone is
insufficient to resolve legal questions because there always will be multiple
resolutions to a legal problem that satisfy this bare minimum. 10 To use
Aristotle’s terms, practical reasoning employs logos (reason), but it also
depends on pathos (preparing the audience to receive the argument) and
ethos (the character of the speaker as shown by the integrity of the
argument). 11 Thus, Garver insists that “Brown is an ethical argument, not an
emotional manipulation or a purely logical argument” and that legal
argumentation depends on ethos to maintain its integrity. 12 The element of
ethos is critical, because when “the connection between reason and character
is severed, the definitive resolutions of the mathematicians and the mere
battle of interest and power are the only alternatives. Practical reason has its
own integrity when who we are and how we think are intimately
connected.” 13
Not all rhetoric has the integrity of practical reasoning. The pejorative
assertion that one engages in “mere rhetoric” acknowledges that practical
reasoning can be abused and imitated by a sophistic speaker who cares only
about successfully motivating the audience to do what the speaker wants. 14
Garver explains that we can distinguish good rhetorical arguments from
sophistry by determining if the argument has ethos. 15 Practical reasoning
implicates ethos, but not all rhetoric displays practical wisdom.
9. Garver explains this in drawing from Aristotle’s insight that “to rely on the audience as the
measure of success for a speech is [in fact to corrupt] the audience.” Id. at 52.
10. Garver explains that ethos “exceeds reason but is never irrational,” by which he means that
logic defines the boundaries of practical reasoning but does not guide it. Id. at 7. As he elaborates, to
“think of ethical relations as matters of commitment, reliability, and integrity is to see ethical
argument as not illogical but as a development of the logical beyond the reach of reason alone.” Id.
at 106.
11. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37–39 (George A.
Kennedy, trans., 2d ed. 2007); JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN
INTRODUCTION 87–90 (4th ed. 2009).
12.

GARVER, supra note 2, at 11.

13.

Id. at 2.

14. “Because practical wisdom requires persuasive power, such persuasive ability is a sign of
practical wisdom. Like most signs, however, it can be manipulated and exploited. Therefore, rhetoric
can take on a life of its own and so become an opponent of practical wisdom.” Id.
15. Garver explains how ethos is a central feature of rising above sophistic manipulation or
limiting oneself to logical deduction: “To think of ethical relations as matters of commitment,
reliability, and integrity is to see ethical argument as not illogical but as a development of the logical
beyond the reach of reason alone.” Id. at 106.

Garver explains that one of the important consequences of legal
argumentation specifically, and practical reasoning generally, is the
generation of what he terms an “ethical surplus.” He cites Brown v. Board of
Education 16 and its legacy as a model of ethical surplus. In Brown, the Court
premised its holding on the special role of public education in American
society; 17 however, this rationale is too limited to justify the civil rights
cases that followed Brown.
Brown shows how reason generates an ethos which then exceeds
reason. Practical reasoning generates an ethical surplus that allows
us to affirm and be committed to more than reason alone would
allow. The Brown decision was justified by a premise about the
place of education in contemporary society, and so was limited to
desegregation in education. But the ethos of the opinion quickly
justified further antidiscrimination rulings. It opened up a new role
for courts, government, and community that went far beyond the
initial desegregation order. Far from being lawless, I regard the
decision as a perfect example of what ethical reasoning looks like
at its best. 18
....
As a chain of deductions, the line from the Fourteenth
Amendment through Brown to Loving fails. Brown relied on the
place of education in society. That justification does no work in the
further cases. Brown transmits something more than the holding
and less than the reasoning to further cases. The meaning of
Brown—its ethos—survives in the ethical surplus of the argument.
That ethical surplus is the antidiscrimination model by which it
commits the Court to desegregation beyond schools. Brown’s
meaning is its understanding of equality and discrimination. That
understanding led to the later decisions. 19
Thus, ethos “allows practical reason to reach conclusions that reason could
not authorize by itself. It generates an ethical surplus which makes practical
reasoning legitimately ampliative. The conclusion is stronger than the
premises that lead to it. Such increase is impossible under a purely deductive
conception of rationality.” 20

16.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

17.

Id. at 493.

18.

GARVER, supra note 2, at 9–10.

19.

Id. at 74.

20. Id. at 73. Garver argues that Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479 (1965), is another
prime example of ethical surplus, beginning as an expression of a right of privacy for married

Garver’s discussion of ethical surplus makes an important and
insightful contribution to our understanding of how the practical reasoning
employed in rhetorical argumentation can be distinguished from sophistic
manipulation. We argue about practical matters with integrity when we
commit our character to the argument. This commitment has an ampliative
effect, generating an ethical surplus that provides the basis for continuing
argumentation that extends beyond the initial claim. Legal practice has
exemplary significance in this regard: legal arguments have integrity
generated by ethos, rather than produced solely by logos.
Garver explains how the concept of ethical surplus illuminates the
nature of legal argumentation. Because ethos is an inescapable element of an
argument that has integrity, the speaker must take responsibility for the
argument and cannot pretend to be a neutral spokesperson for logical truths.
Garver concludes Brown is a paradigm of legal reasoning not only because
the decision had ethical surplus, but because the Justices acknowledged their
responsibility for what the decision implied. 21 Responsibility extends
beyond the decision reached in the case at hand because the argumentation
commits the parties to an ethical surplus that has unknown contours.
The Supreme Court can declare that the nation is committed to
equality so that it must find legal segregation of public schools at
variance with its fundamental commitments and therefore
unconstitutional. Neither the Court nor the public knows at that
time whether this commitment extends to integration, or simply to
banning legal segregation. No one knows in advance of actual
decisions: that is their ampliative and ethical nature. Court and
country have to decide, case by case, what happens to the
commitment to equality when it conflicts with other basic values,
freedom of association, freedom from government interference,
federalism, competing interpretations of equality and equal
protection. 22

couples and gradually expanding to more general conceptions of privacy in intimate aspects of one’s
life. Id. at 225 n.11. On the other hand, he cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 341 U.S. 1 (1948), as an
example of an important case that gets the answer right, but does so in a cramped, quasi-deductive
manner that does not generate an ethical surplus. Id. at 228–29 n.29.
21.

Id. at 79–80.

22. Id. at 83–84. We wish to emphasize that we are describing Garver’s use of Brown to
illustrate a feature of practical reasoning, and we do not discount the many controversies
surrounding Brown and its legacy. By acknowledging the “ethical surplus” of the decision we are not
claiming that the Justices worked from a pure moral position, or even that the decision provided a
just result to the plaintiffs in the case before the Court. Derrick Bell has famously argued that in our
racially oppressive society the majority will recognize the rights of the minority only when the
majority’s interests are advanced. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1979). Specifically, Bell argues that
Brown was not solely the product of an ethical stand against racial inequality. Id. at 524–25. Instead

Practical reasoning is always incomplete in the sense that it is a prelude to
future deliberations that cannot all be resolved as part of the original
decision. Ethos is a relationship between speaker and listener akin to
friendship: one cannot determine in advance what a friend will do in
recognition of the friendship, although the existence of the friendship clearly
must be established by discrete acts. 23
Additionally, the ethical nature of legal argumentation shapes the
manner and style of the argument. Logical arguments consist of numerous
small steps that must strictly follow from the preceding step, so these
arguments may be long and complex in order to maintain their logical
integrity. In contrast, if practical reasoning is too convoluted or extended
then the ethical component of the argumentation can be disrupted.
The ethical terms of that relationship between speaker and
audience are violated if a speaker tries to draw consequences that
are too remote, but what counts as too remote is a matter for
negotiation and trust between speaker and hearer. There is no
mathematical measure for an inference being too long or an
implication being too remote . . . . In the Rhetoric, responsibility
for the implications of one’s assertions is an ethical responsibility,
limited by ethical considerations of proximity and probability. 24
The result is that as “practical argument gets more philosophical, technical
or precise, it gets worse.” 25

powerful white interests recognized it was necessary to end apartheid to secure economic and
political growth in the post-War global world, and so they supported the decision. Id. Bell
acknowledges that his analysis
may seem insufficient proof of self-interest leverage to produce a decision as important
as Brown. They are cited, however, to help assess and not to diminish the Supreme
Court’s most important statement on the principle of racial equality. Here, as in the
abolition of slavery, there were whites for whom recognition of the racial equality
principle was sufficient motivation. But, as with abolition, the number who would act
on morality alone was insufficient to bring about the desired racial reform.
Id. at 525. This analysis does not undermine Garver’s thesis about ethical surplus. Instead, it
strengthens it. Recognizing that many complex factors motivated the decision in Brown only
highlights the power of the resulting ethical surplus to carry Brown far beyond what cautious whites
in the 1950s may have envisioned. Ethical surplus has the power to pull us away from prejudices that
may have been present when the ethos was first embodied.
23. Garver is careful to invoke the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship; he does not have a
superficial or naïve concept in mind. He explains: “Civic and rhetorical friendship is not the
friendship of love between intimates, but still is friendship and not just a formal legal relation
between strangers or enemies.” GARVER, supra note 2, at 9; see also id. at 106.
24.

Id. at 81–82.

25.

Id. at 154.

III. THE WAR ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
In this part of the Article, we employ Garver’s thesis of “ethical
surplus” in a negative sense. By negative we do not mean that the arguments
lack ethos, but rather that the arguments are supported by an ethos that is
undesirable and counterproductive. In Part III.A, we describe the rhetoric
surrounding the legal, political, and social attacks on illegal immigration and
show how the metaphor that the nation is engaged in a “war” on illegal
immigration structures the rhetoric. Arizona was one of the first states to
most fully realize this rhetoric in contemporary discourse, but it arose
against the historical backdrop of a national discourse. 26 In Part III.B, we
trace one of the ampliative effects of the argumentative discourse declaring
war on illegal immigration—the effort to ban ethnic-conscious educational
strategies in the public schools in Arizona. By embracing the rhetoric of
fighting a war against illegal immigration, public figures in Arizona have
aligned the ethos of their argument with exclusionary and discriminatory
motives that later came to fruition in the more specific attack on multicultural education.
A. The “War on” Rhetoric in Border Enforcement Policy and Practice
We begin by revealing the war rhetoric that sustains the arguments
against illegal immigration. This war on illegal immigration is not limited to
rhetorical flourishes by contemporary politicians seeking to emphasize the
importance of the immigration issue; rather, these expressions reveal much
about the deeper justifications at work. Over the past century, politicians
have embraced the ethos of fighting a war at the border to implement various
programs that restrict the immigration of Mexicans to the United States. We
begin by describing the ethos and then consider the manifestations of this
developing ethos over time in several public policy and legal issues. We first
want to avoid a misunderstanding that has the potential to obscure our thesis.
We are not arguing that there was a formal declaration of war and that the
logical implication of this declaration was that the United States must fight
certain battles and regain certain territory. To the contrary, ethical surplus
arises because a person engaged in resolving a discrete problem through
practical reasoning generates an ethos that is relatively inchoate and subject
to further elaboration as future problems are addressed. We seek to provide a
sense of the historical development of the ethos of the war on immigration,
to the extent possible in this short essay.

26. Common Thread Present in Immigration Law Challenges, CNN (June 28, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/28/immigration.laws/index.html.

1. Border Control and the Executive Branch
The U.S. government created the Border Patrol in 1924 to secure the
border from outside invaders. 27 In doing so, the executive branch
deliberately and self-consciously created a border where essentially none
had previously existed. 28 As historian Mae Ngai summarizes, “more than
anything else, the formation of the Border Patrol raised the border.” 29 Those
who urged the establishment of a Border Patrol argued that it was the
southern border that needed protection. 30 The first members of the Border
Patrol were former law enforcement and military personnel who saw their
mission as the establishment and defense of a clear, securable border. 31
Border Patrol officers took it upon themselves to enforce the border through
criminal enforcement strategies, even though their mandate was to enforce
civil provisions of the immigration statute. 32 The Border Patrol adopted its
basic modes of operation at a time of increasing hostility toward Mexicans,
and these modes of operation have continued into the present. 33 Today, the
specter of the border as highly contested and vulnerable to invasion has only
increased
immigration-enforcement
operations,
initiatives,
and
deportations. 34
More than eighty years later, the rhetoric demanding protection of the
homeland against foreign enemies remains strong. After 9/11, the
consolidation of federal immigration agencies into the newly formed
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) only emphasized the connection
between border enforcement and protecting the homeland from terrorism. 35

27.

MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 67 (2004).

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 68.

30.

Id.

31. Id.; Border Patrol Career Videos: Protecting the Homeland Video, CBP.GOV,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/careers/customs_careers/border_careers/bp_agent/videos/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2012).
32.

NGAI, supra note 27, at 69.

33.

Id. at 69–70.

34. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Secretary Napolitano Announces RecordBreaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics Achieved Under the Obama Administration (Oct. 6,
2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286389936778.shtm.
35. In a 2003 report, the DHS stated as its mission, “We will lead the unified national effort to
secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats
and hazards to the Nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and
visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 6 (2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/x
library/assets/PerformanceAccountabilityReportFY03.pdf.

With this development, the role of the Border Patrol became more explicitly
militarized, and its mission now fully incorporates both homeland security
and anti-terrorism goals. 36 In fact, the newly formed Customs and Border
Protection Agency (CBP) states that its top priority is to “keep terrorists and
their weapons from entering the United States.” 37 The CBP explicitly uses
militaristic images in its efforts to appeal to and recruit members. 38 One of
its commercials shows military vehicles, helicopters, and men on horseback
chasing after people running across desert landscapes. 39 Another has a
somber voice-over that announces, “In the twilight hours, while most of the
county is sleeping, we’re out there, guarding our borders, protecting the
homeland . . . the Border Patrol, we protect America.” 40
The continued deployment of military units, such as the National
Guard, to aid Border Patrol operations along the southwest border evidences
the militaristic character of the CBP. 41 The Secure Fence Act of 2006, which
increased funds to border enforcement, authorized funding for surveillance
equipment and called for the building of a 2000-mile border fence across the
Southwest. 42 This action created an increasingly militarized zone around the
border. 43 The Obama Administration has increased the budget for both
customs and border enforcement activities, suggesting that the heightened
militarism may become a permanent feature. 44
2. Border Control and the Congressional and Judicial Branches
The rhetoric of fighting a war against illegal immigration has animated
36.

See id.

37. CBP: Securing America’s Borders, CBP.GOV (July 15, 2011), previously available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/whats_new.xml.
38. See BP Hiring, Border Patrol Tactical 30 Sec, YOUTUBE (July 2, 2008), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=jdTQhiVaCEI.
39.

Id.

40.

See CBP: Securing America’s Borders, supra note 37.

41. Operation Jumpstart, CBP.GOV (July 6, 2006), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/news/news
room/multimedia/video/border_security_videos/bp_videos/; see also Lisa Daniel, Obama:
Guardsmen Can Aid Intelligence, Interdiction at Border, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (May 27, 2010),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59375. President Obama authorized the latest
deployment of National Guard troops to Arizona in May 2010, shortly after Arizona’s Senate Bill
1070 was passed into law. Id. The latest deployment of National Guard troops to Arizona occurred
shortly after Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 was passed into law in May 2010. Id.
42. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638-2640, available at
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=476360.
43.

Id.

44. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 BUDGET IN BRIEF (2011), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib_fy2011.pdf.

the legislation and case law that first defines the “illegal” immigration and
then provides for enforcement. Supreme Court decisions on immigrationrelated issues historically place great emphasis on the need for the federal
government to be able to control its borders from invading masses, whether
or not these invaders are sponsored by a foreign government. 45 The Supreme
Court has firmly established that Congress has the plenary power to control
immigration and entry into the United States. 46 It has deemed the regulation
of immigration to be a national function and an important element of the
country’s ability to secure itself against invading foreign “hordes.” 47 In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, the Court set out the framework that is the
foundation of today’s extreme deference to congressional power over
immigration regulation, including border enforcement. 48 The Court held that
Congress had the authority, vested in part in the War Powers Clause, to
exclude Chinese nationals from entry and from citizenship. 49 The Court
based its rationale on historical rhetoric of self-defense 50 and defense of the
sovereignty from foreign invasion. 51 The Court stated,
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation,
and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon us. 52
Although the Chinese immigrants did not appear on our shore bearing arms
and wearing the uniform of a foreign country, the Court clearly presented
them as invaders whom the United States must repel.
The Court broadened the war rhetoric as it extended congressional
power to instances of “peaceful invasion.” 53 The Court cited the example of
foreigners who sought physical entry into the United States but who also

45. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
46.

Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581.

47.

Id. at 609.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 606.

50.

Id. at 607–09.

51.

Id. at 609.

52.

Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.

53.

See id.

continued to maintain their foreign identities. 54 The Court explained,
If, therefore, the government of the United States . . . considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will
not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security,
their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no
actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are
subjects. 55
According to the Court, a formal declaration of war was unnecessary. 56 As
long as Congress perceived a threat of foreign invasion, it could do all it
deemed necessary to protect the sovereignty of the United States. 57 As the
Court emphasized, “The existence of war would render the necessity of the
proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less
pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority
which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the
other.” 58
The rhetorical move connecting immigration and invading forces has
been consistent since Chae Chan Ping. Courts use the rhetoric of war to give
broad powers to Congress to control entry into, and expulsion from, the
United States. 59 The Supreme Court invoked security concerns in a Cold
War Era case involving congressional imposition of a deportability ground
for current or past members of the Communist Party. 60 The decision affected
many noncitizens, including long-term permanent residents of the United
States. 61 The Court analyzed the constitutionality of the congressional
provision allowing for deportation of past Communist Party members and
found the provision constitutional, based on Congress’s broad authority to
protect the sovereign. 62 The Court stated,
The Government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been
asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose.
War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort
to the power . . . . But it does not require war to bring the power of
54.

Id. at 596–97.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 606.

57.

Id.

58.

Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.

59. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
60.

Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587.

61.

Id. at 585–88.

62.

Id. at 587.

deportation into existence or to authorize its exercise.
Congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dangers short of
war may lead to its use. So long as the alien elects to continue the
ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile here is held by a
precarious tenure. 63
The Court recognized the dangerous ethos at work and shamelessly sought
to insulate itself from complicity, while reinforcing Congress’s vital role in
protecting the country from invasion. The Court stated,
Under the conditions which produced this Act, can we declare that
congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power without
and Communist conspiracy within the United States is either a
fantasy or a pretense? . . . Certainly no responsible American
would say that there were [when the Act was enacted in 1940] or
are now no possible grounds on which Congress might believe that
Communists in our midst are inimical to our security.
Congress received evidence that the Communist movement
here has been heavily laden with aliens, and that Soviet control of
the American Communist Party has been largely through alien
Communists. It would be easy for those of us who do not have
security responsibility to say that those who do are taking
Communism too seriously, and overestimating its danger . . . . We,
in our private opinions, need not concur in Congress’ policies to
hold its enactments constitutional. 64
We can see the broad-based nature of the war rhetoric used in
connection with immigration during the past century. When supporting
policy measures, the executive, legislature, and judiciary all rely on the ethos
of defending the nation from incursion. The Supreme Court granted
Congress extensive power to define who could legally enter the United
States, and then to wage war against illegal immigration, even as it tried to
distance itself from some of the odious tactics employed. This plenary power
engendered the militaristic roots of the Border Patrol, which have been
magnified since 9/11. 65 With this established ethos, we now turn to the
expression of the ethical surplus in Arizona.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 590.

65.

See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 44.

B. The “War on” Rhetoric in Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070
Despite the Supreme Court’s clear deference to Congress on
immigration issues, there has been a constant tension between the federal
government and border state governments about how best to protect the
country at the border. The most recent clash came to a head in Arizona with
the passage and signing of Senate Bill 1070, the Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. 66 The Act’s intent is stated in the
legislation,
The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the
cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout
all of Arizona. The legislature declares that the intent of this act is
to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state
and local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this
act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the
unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by
persons unlawfully present in the United States. 67
The rhetoric surrounding the passage of the Act mirrors much of the federal
judicial, legislative, and administrative rhetoric on the need to maintain
security by defending a border against alien hordes. The proponents of
Senate Bill 1070 repeatedly stressed the need to secure the state’s borders
and to protect citizens from invasion in light of the failure of the federal
government to provide an adequate defense of the border. 68
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer issued a statement at the bill signing in
which she emphasized the security goals of the legislation, even though the
legislature ostensibly intended to target illegal immigration. She stated,
There is no higher priority than protecting the citizens of Arizona.
We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug
cartels. We cannot stand idly by as drop houses, kidnappings and
violence compromise our quality of life . . . . We cannot delay
while the destruction happening south of our international border
creeps its way north . . . . Yesterday, I announced the steps I was
taking to enhance security along our border. Today–with my
unwavering signature on this legislation–Arizona strengthens its
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security within our borders. 69
One of the most controversial features of the legislation is that it allows
law enforcement to stop someone and question him or her if the official has
a reasonable suspicion that the person may be undocumented. 70 Opponents
argued that racial profiling would lead to the harassment of Mexican
Americans in Arizona. 71 In response, Governor Brewer spent a great deal of
time reassuring state residents that a law targeting noncitizens could and
would be implemented without infringing the rights of Mexican
Americans. 72 Ironically, by framing her advocacy in these terms, she
highlighted the inevitable collateral damage of a war on noncitizens in a
state bordering Mexico. The fact that she and proponents of the legislation
framed undocumented immigration as a “Mexican problem” made the issue
one of race or national origin.
Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce, the original sponsor of Senate
Bill 1070, also focused on the importance of the legislation as a tool to stop
invasion, stating, “I will not back off until we solve the problem of this
illegal invasion . . . . Invaders, that’s what they are. Invaders on the
American sovereignty and it [cannot] be tolerated.” 73 When attempting to
frame the problem in terms of illegal immigration to a reporter, however, the
Senator conflated national origin, culture, and immigration status in his
explanation for sponsoring state immigration enforcement legislation. 74 He
stated, “Drive around parts of Phoenix. I get calls all the time and it’s not
because they’re Hispanic, it’s because the culture is different. The gangs are
bigger. There’s more violence, kidnappings are way up.” 75 Senator Pearce
responded to the U.S Department of Justice’s lawsuit to enjoin
implementation of Senate Bill 1070 by continuing to defend the right of the
state to maintain its war on illegal immigration. 76 Senator Pearce referred to
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the defense of the legislation as part of that war and explained,
The purpose of SB 1070 is to protect the citizens of Arizona from
the devastating and deadly impact of rampant illegal immigration.
And it is outrageous that the Obama administration would attack
Arizona for simply protecting its own citizens, especially when it
has failed so miserably to do its constitutional duty and secure the
border. This is a legal battle of epic proportions. As a Senator in a
state on the frontlines, I see firsthand the damage being done to our
state and our country. What happens here in Arizona will impact
every state in the country interested in protecting its citizens by
enforcing the rule of law. We are a nation of laws. We must have
the courage – the fortitude – to enforce, with compassion but
without apology, those laws that protect the integrity of our borders
and the rights of our lawful citizens. 77
Governor Brewer and Senator Pearce both utilized war rhetoric, and their
statements reveal the true enemy in this war. Their characterization of the
issue gave every indication that they were referring to people of Mexican
national origin when they discussed the threat facing Arizona. Their rhetoric
led them to move from protecting the physical border, to dealing with
undocumented immigrants in their midst, and to protecting the country—and
its traditional American values—from invasion by Mexican Americans and
other Latinos.
IV. THE ETHICAL SURPLUS OF THE WAR ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION:
THE WAR ON LATINOS

We have described how immigration policy at the federal level has been
rooted in the war metaphor during the past century and how Arizona has
embraced this metaphor in its challenge to the notion of federal supremacy
on immigration policy. 78 Arizona officials have turned the war rhetoric
against the federal government, essentially accusing it of a de facto
surrender that calls for an extraordinary response by State officials to rebuff
the unrelenting enemy. 79 The United States must fight wars against enemies,
and since the Mexican government is not at war with the United States, the
enemy is seen as the Mexican people. Their weapons are not tanks and
missiles, but instead are drugs, crime, and the invasion of a servile and unAmerican class of people.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/news/2010/jul/state-senator-russell-pearce-author-arizona-s-sb-1070seeks-intervene-federal-lawsuit- [hereinafter JUD. WATCH].
77.
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In this part of the Article, we trace the extension of the war metaphor
beyond questions of border security or drug enforcement and illustrate its
manifestation in the contemporary culture wars. We begin by emphasizing
that this is not a simple story of racism clothed with sophistic justification.
We are addressing a far more subtle and dangerous phenomenon—the power
of ethical surplus. Undoubtedly there are some Arizonans who detest people
of Mexican ethnicity and who use seemingly neutral factors such as border
security to support their goal of minimizing the presence of Mexicans in
their state. We do not claim that the Arizona officials we discuss below are
express racists, although they may well be. Rather, we argue that the ethical
surplus of the war on illegal immigration expands far beyond the original
scope of border security and amounts to a war on Mexican Americans and
Mexicans living in Arizona.
A. The War and Self-Defense Language Surrounding House Bill 2281
On May 11, 2010, a few days after passage of Senate Bill 1070,
Governor Jan Brewer signed House Bill 2281 into law. 80 The law amended
the Arizona education code to prohibit ethnic studies curricula in public
schools. 81 The Act’s main provision prohibits courses or classes that: (1)
promote the overthrow of the U.S. government; (2) promote resentment
toward a race or class of people; (3) are designed primarily for pupils of a
particular ethnic group; and (4) advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the
treatment of pupils as individuals. 82 Tom Horne—then the Arizona
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the driving force behind House Bill
2281—advocated for the legislation by emphasizing the threatening
implications of the Tucson Unified School District’s (TUSD) ethnic studies
curriculum. Horne claimed offense at what he described as the distortion of
American history, including the program’s portrayal of the Alamo and of the
U.S. occupation of Mexican lands in the 1800s. 83 Horne cited quotations
from textbooks and related materials used in the program to illustrate how
the curriculum challenged the “true” mainstream version of American
history. 84 Horne claims this alternative view facilitates an invasion from
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within by Mexicans and their proxies. 85 In a letter proposing action against
the Tucson School District, Horne disparaged the language of one of the
program’s textbooks. 86 Horne noted, “The textbook states: ‘Texans had
never come to grips with the fact that Mexicans had won at the Alamo.’” 87
Horne then commented, “It is certainly strange to find a textbook in an
American public school taking the Mexican side of the battle at the
Alamo.” 88
Horne’s articulation of the problem with ethnic studies courses that
“take the Mexican side” illustrates just how the “war on” rhetoric has an
ethical surplus that bleeds into areas of dispute wholly outside the specific
questions of immigration policy. This is dramatically evidenced by the
language of the bill, which targets ethnic-conscious educational programs
and also bans promoting the overthrow of the U.S. government, as if these
offenses are somehow related. 89
The ethical surplus stemming from a “war on” mentality in the
immigration context encompasses an Anglo-centric point of view in
education that necessarily excludes the minority view. The ethical surplus of
the war rhetoric conflates illegal immigration and the educational efficacy of
an ethnic studies program that is factually accurate but not ideologically
compliant with mainstream views. Horne sees the two issues as part of the
same broad principle about the superiority of the American (read Anglo)
perspective and the need to protect it from invasions that include not only
illegal immigration but also educational subversion of the U.S. government.
Proponents of anti-ethnic studies legislation have alleged that an ethnic
studies curriculum encourages or condones illegal immigration when its
textbooks cover the United States–Mexico border. 90 Horne, for example,
quotes one textbook as saying, “Apparently the U.S. is having as little
success in keeping the Mexicans out of Aztlan as Mexico had when they
tried to keep the North Americans out of Texas in 1830.” 91 Horne
interpreted this statement as alluding to illegal immigration control, rather
than either legal immigration regulation or the growth of the Mexican
population in the southwestern United States. Using this textbook excerpt as
an illustration, Horne condemned the program, warning that “books paid for
by American taxpayers used in American public schools are gloating over
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the difficulty we are having in controlling the border.” 92 Horne conjured up
images of self-defense, implying that failure to stop such programs could
lead to a re-conquest or a re-invasion. He uses another textbook excerpt to
warn of impending danger at the hands of Latinos. He notes that the
textbook excerpt “goes on to state: ‘. . . the Latinos are now realizing that the
power to control Aztlan may once again be in their hands.’” 93 He further
invokes excerpts of the MEChA 94 constitution to demonstrate the threat, not
just of invasion, but of disregard of borders, thus linking ethnic identification
and illegal immigration in one fell swoop. 95 Horne quotes the MEChA
language, implying that the organization’s radical mission statement of the
1970s is still operational today, “‘Aztlán belongs to those who plant the
seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign
Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze
continent.’” 96 In Horne’s view, this invasion continues under the guise of
ethnic studies, and it must be stopped. 97 The campaign to repel invasive
forces must therefore expand from the illegal immigration realm and Senate
Bill 1070 to include the eradication of ethnic studies programs, which
themselves constitute a threat.
B. Making the Connections: The War on Latinos and Ethnicity
In November 2010, Tom Horne won his campaign for Attorney General
of Arizona, 98 and as soon as he took office, he publicized his intention to
defend Senate Bill 1070. 99 When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
injunction against portions of Senate Bill 1070, he made clear that he would
support the law. 100 He continues to speak out about his perceived duty to

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94. MEChA, the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan, is a student group that originated
as a student movement in 1969 and is still active. About Us, MOVIMIENTO ESTUDIANTIL CHICANO
DE AZTLÁN, http://www.nationalmecha.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
95.

Letter from Tom Horne, supra note 83, at 3.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98. Mary Jo Pitzl, Tom Horne’s Narrow Attorney General Victory Finishes GOP Sweep of
Arizona, REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2010/
11/11/20101111arizona-attorney-general-tom-horne-victory.html.
99. Press Release, Tom Horne, Attorney Gen., Ariz., New Era at Attorney General’s Office as
Horne Officially Joins State Effort To Defend S.B. 1070 Against Obama Administration Legal
Change (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.azag.gov/press_releases/jan/2011/1070%20DEFEN
CE.html.
100.

Press Release, Joint Statement by Governor Jan Brewer and Attorney General Tom Horne

secure the Arizona border. 101 In his capacity as Attorney General he filed a
counterclaim in the federal government’s challenge to Senate Bill 1070,
charging the federal government with negligence in its border enforcement
efforts. 102
Now charged with defending House Bill 2281 against court challenge,
Attorney General Horne is in a position to ensure the implementation of the
law that he championed. As one of his last acts as state schools
superintendent, just hours before he took office as Attorney General, Horne
found that the Tucson Unified School District out of compliance with A.R.S.
15-122(b), the codification of House Bill 2281. 103 He continues to speak
publicly about the importance of the anti-ethnic studies legislation he
championed. 104
It is not merely coincidence that Horne places such emphasis on these
two laws. In rhetorical argumentation one must display ethos, which
generates an ethical surplus that moves people to adopt positions that do not
logically follow from the initial decision supported by the ethos. 105 We have
traced the ethical surplus of the war on illegal immigration from questions of
security and protection to the view that ethnic studies programs undermine
our security as a nation. A campaign ad used by Tom Horne in his successful
run for Attorney General of Arizona embodies this ethical surplus. 106 The ad
starts with an explanation of Horne’s tireless advocacy for an ethnic studies
ban, and without any logical connection, or any manner of explanation, the
ad ends with the tag, “As Attorney General, Tom Horne will protect our
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borders.” 107 As a logical extension, the ad makes an unsupported and
ridiculous leap. However, as an embodiment of the war rhetoric adopted in
Arizona, voters intuitively understand this ad, with the result that the
discriminatory connections necessary to extend the ethical surplus remain
hidden from view, perhaps even Horne’s view. This permits voters who
share Horne’s ethos to regard themselves as a tolerant and accepting people
who are simply doing what is necessary to protect the country from an
invasion.
Horne continues to link ethnic studies programs with support for illegal
immigration as he makes his case for restrictive state legislation to protect
the country from a Mexican invasion. When teachers in Tucson’s ethnic
studies program filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against House Bill
2281’s implementation, Horne issued a press statement that again made the
connection explicit. 108 Horne stated,
The ‘Derechos’ group [which he claimed was behind the lawsuit,
although not a named party] is an open-borders group that opposes
the very existence of a physical border between the United States
and Mexico, uses inflammatory language to denigrate it[s]
opponents, and favorably cites academic studies that compare the
treatment of illegal immigrants in the U.S. to apartheid. 109
Horne concludes that an immigrant advocacy group supporting a legal
challenge to an ethnic studies program ban proves that ethnic solidarity,
Mexican immigration, and border security must be linked. 110 The ethical
surplus of the war rhetoric that encompasses self-defense, security, and
military protection against an invading Mexican force almost naturally
encompasses an anti-ethnic studies attitude. It has led proponents to
conclude that teaching high school history that acknowledges the border as a
historically contested boundary necessarily subverts efforts to defend the
border against intrusion by illegal immigrants.
V. CONCLUSION
Our thesis should not be an earth-shattering revelation. Employing the
rhetoric of “war on” invariably leads to demonizing an “other,” particularly
on racial grounds. During World War II there was express, official, and

107.

Id.

108. Press Release, Tom Horne, Superintendent, Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., State Schools
Superintendent Tom Horne Statement on ‘Derechos’ Ethnic Studies Lawsuit (Oct. 18, 2010),
available at http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/kgun/KGUN/10%2018%20Horne%20statement.pdf.
109.

Id.

110.

See id.

destructive discrimination against Japanese Americans, 111 but there was also
discrimination against German Americans, despite their race and close ties
to the mainstream cultural consciousness of America. 112 The Cold War
generated backlashes against foreign elements that were racialized as an
attack on subversive Jewish elements, which was sadly epitomized in the
executions of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. 113 War and racism seem to go
hand in hand.
On the other hand, we hope that we have clarified why it is a mistake to
read these events as nothing more than the expression of pre-existing racial
discrimination. It is the power of the war rhetoric that leads the speaker who
embodies its ethos far beyond the initial, reasonable determination of what is
necessary to secure the country from attack. Ethos can be a powerful force
through the ethical surplus it generates, which means that we must remain
vigilant in reviewing the ethos to which we commit ourselves.
Ethical surplus gains strength over time, and so it is important to attend
to history. The generation of racist policies as the “ethical surplus” of war
rhetoric is not something new to Arizona. In her account of the infamous
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1917 Bisbee deportation, 114 historian Katherine Benton-Cohen demonstrates
that justifications framed by war rhetoric fueled this overtly racist and
patently unconstitutional act of massive vigilantism against perceived threats
from men of Mexican or Eastern European ancestry. 115 In the literal and
obvious sense, the Bisbee County Sheriff, Harry Wheeler, justified the
deportation of activist miners seeking labor concessions from the PhelpsDodge mining company as being necessary to ensure the material support
for the United States’s involvement in World War I and to protect the United
States from the destabilizing civil war waged by Pancho Villa in Mexico. 116
The war rhetoric was so strong an influence, though, that Sheriff Wheeler
could make the astounding assertion that the deportation was not in response
to a labor disturbance. 117
Confirmation of the power of the ethical surplus of the war rhetoric
came in stark terms in the early 1920s when 210 vigilantes were acquitted of
criminal charges of kidnapping. 118 Defense lawyers utilized the legal
doctrine of “necessity” to defend the deportation of workers, arguing that the
kidnappings constituted a legitimate repulsion of an invader threatening U.S.
security and tranquility. 119 Despite the overwhelming evidence adduced
during the three-month trial, the jury acquitted the defendants on the first
ballot. 120
It is sobering to consider the power of ethical surplus. Tom Horne is not
engaged in faulty or illogical reasoning that can be exposed with clarity and
certainty. He is not arguing that two plus two equals five. Rather, he is
participating in an ethos that many people acting in good faith share, and the
conclusions regarding the danger of ethnic studies legislation are plausible
positions within this ethos. Calling these supporters racist will have no
effect, because they have embraced an ostensibly non-racist ethos that
subtends their practical reasoning about public affairs. In short, we must
challenge the ethos on its own terms to reverse some of its troubling
applications.
Countering the rhetoric of a war on illegal immigration requires a
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reconstitution of the rhetorical space for public debate so that we may
replace the strong and abiding ethos that has shaped immigration policy
during the modern era. Although profoundly difficult, this task is not
impossible. Consider Garver’s example of the positive force of ethical
surplus. Brown v. Board of Education confronted head on the apartheid state
and its racist underpinnings, generating an ethical surplus that persisted
through decades of cases that implemented the equality principle in diverse
areas of American life. 121 The question of equal education remains troubling
today, but the legacy of Brown has reached far beyond the specific matter
before the Court. As Garver once commented, “Because of Brown we have
handicapped parking spaces.” 122 We have plenty of rhetorical resources
from which to draw in reconfiguring the ethos of the immigration debate:
Ellis Island, the Statue of Liberty, “strength through diversity,” “equal
opportunity,” and so on. And, we must do so.
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